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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Louis Michael Winkler, Jr., Respondent, 
v. 
State of South Carolina, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-000904 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Appeal From Horry County 

James E. Lockemy, Trial Court Judge 

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Post-Conviction Relief Judge 

Opinion No. 27685 

Heard April 13, 2016 – Filed November 23, 2016 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney 
General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney 
General J. Anthony Mabry and Assistant Attorney 
General Alphonso Simon, Jr., all of Columbia, for 
Petitioner. 
Emily C. Paavola, of Justice 360,  of Columbia, and John 
R. Mills, of San Francisco, California, for Respondent. 
JUSTICE FEW: This is a post-conviction relief (PCR) action arising out of 
Louis Michael Winkler, Jr.'s murder conviction and death sentence.  We reverse 
the PCR court's ruling that trial counsel was ineffective in the sentencing phase of 
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Winkler's trial for not objecting when the trial court did not answer the jury's 
questions about the consequences of a failure to reach a unanimous verdict.  We 
also reverse the PCR court's denial of Winkler's pretrial motions in the PCR action 
in which he requested additional time to obtain and analyze evidence related to his 
alleged brain damage. Because the denial of additional time deprived Winkler of 
the opportunity to adequately develop his PCR claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate brain damage, we vacate the PCR court's ruling 
denying that claim.  We remand to the PCR court for further proceedings. 
I. Procedural History 
On the evening of the murder, Winkler kicked in the door to his estranged wife's 
home, knocked her son to the ground, and shot her in the face, killing her instantly.  
In addition to murder, Winkler was convicted of first-degree burglary and assault 
and battery of a high and aggravated nature.  We described the specific facts of the 
crimes in our opinion affirming the convictions and death sentence on direct 
appeal. State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 579-82, 698 S.E.2d 596, 599-600 (2010), 
cert. denied, 563 U.S. 963 (2011). 
After Winkler filed an application for PCR, the PCR court entered a scheduling 
order that it later amended to set a specific trial date.  Winkler twice moved to 
amend the scheduling order so PCR counsel could have more time to obtain and 
analyze MRI and PET scans of his brain to investigate the possibility of brain 
damage. On the first motion, the PCR court extended the deadline for filing an 
amended application, but refused to extend any other deadlines, including the trial 
date. The PCR court denied the second motion. 
At the close of Winkler's presentation of evidence at the PCR trial, the court 
granted the State a directed verdict on Winkler's claim that his trial counsel— 
Ralph Wilson and Paul Rathbun—were ineffective in failing to investigate and 
present evidence of Winkler's brain damage.  In its final order, the court found 
Winkler "did not present any evidence that he suffered from neurological and 
cognitive impairments or dysfunction."  
However, the court granted Winkler PCR on the ground that trial counsel were 
ineffective in the sentencing phase of the criminal trial when they did not object to 
the trial court's refusal to answer the jury's questions as to what would happen if 
the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on Winkler's sentence.  Instead of 
ordering a new sentencing proceeding, the PCR court "sentenced" Winkler to life 
in prison.
14 

  
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
In the sentencing phase, after deliberating for more than six and a half hours, the 
jury sent a note to the trial court asking, "Could you please explain what happens if 
we're not able to reach a unanimous decision?"  The trial court, the State, and 
Winkler's trial counsel agreed the note was not a communication the jury was 
deadlocked. The trial court sent a written response to the jury's note stating, "I 
cannot answer the question the way you phrased it.  Please let me know if you have 
any other questions." Trial counsel did not object. 
After the jury deliberated for approximately two more hours, the trial court sent 
another written note to the jury asking, "do you have any questions or messages for 
the court?" The jury replied "[W]hat [does] the law state when a jury does not 
reach any unanimous decision at this stage of the trial?"  The trial court then sent a 
note to the jury stating, "I cannot answer hypothetical questions.  Do you have any 
specific questions to ask or comments that you would like to make about your 
jury?" Trial counsel did not object.  
Sometime later, the jury sent a note indicating it was having difficulty reaching a 
verdict. The trial court then decided to give the jury a version of an Allen1 charge. 
At 12:26 a.m., the trial court gave the jury a modified Allen charge.  In the charge, 
it informed the jury two times "the decision of the jury must be unanimous."  After 
giving the charge, the trial court allowed the jury to choose whether to continue 
deliberating that night or come back the next day.  The jury chose to return the next 
morning. 
The following morning, before the jury resumed deliberations, the trial court told 
the jury to let it know if the jury needed to re-hear the Allen charge.  One juror 
requested to re-hear the charge.  Wilson initially objected, arguing it was 
inappropriate to give the charge again.  After a discussion with the solicitor and the 
trial court, however, Wilson withdrew his objection.  The trial court then re-read 
the modified Allen charge. Less than an hour later, the jury returned a verdict 
recommending the death penalty. 
After the PCR court granted Winkler PCR, the State and Winkler each filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari.  We granted certiorari on three questions: (1) 
whether the PCR court erred "in finding trial counsel were ineffective in failing to 
object when the trial judge declined to answer the jury's questions regarding the 
1 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896).  
15 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
consequences of a failure to reach a unanimous verdict in a capital murder 
sentencing proceeding in light of the trial judge's instruction to the jury that a 
recommendation of either death or life imprisonment must be unanimous;" (2) 
whether the PCR court "abuse[d its] discretion in denying [Winkler's] motion to 
alter the PCR scheduling order and therefore err[ed] in finding [Winkler] failed to 
carry his burden of proving trial counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate 
mitigating evidence of brain damage;" and (3) whether "the PCR court err[ed] in 
failing to remand for a new sentencing proceeding."  We denied certiorari on all 
other issues, including the State's argument the PCR court erred in finding trial 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Allen charge. 
II. Allen Charge 
Before we reach the merits of the questions as to which we granted the writ of 
certiorari, we address Winkler's argument we should dismiss the writ because of an 
issue as to which we denied certiorari.  Winkler argues the PCR court granted 
relief on the independent basis that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
an unconstitutionally coercive Allen charge and that ruling renders his PCR final, 
regardless of the outcome of this appeal.  See Dawson v. State, 352 S.C. 15, 20, 
572 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2002) (stating an Allen charge cannot be unconstitutionally 
coercive, "but must instead be even-handed, directing both the majority and the 
minority to consider the other's views").  Thus, Winkler argues, we do not need to 
consider the question of whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 
the trial court's decision not to answer the jury's questions. 
The PCR court's final order is confusing on this point.  The issue is further 
confused by the fact the State petitioned for certiorari claiming "the PCR court 
erred in finding trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Allen charge." 
However, we find the PCR court did not rule trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the Allen charge. Rather, the PCR court granted Winkler relief based 
only on trial counsel's decision not to object to the trial court not answering the 
jury's questions regarding a failure to reach a unanimous verdict.  In doing so, the 
PCR court relied in part on its conclusion that the modified Allen charge contained 
an incorrect statement of law because the charge stated the decision of the jury 
must be unanimous.  Because the PCR court did not grant Winkler relief on the 
independent ground that trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the 
modified Allen charge, we deny Winkler's request that we dismiss the writ of 
certiorari, and we proceed to address the merits of the questions on which we 
granted certiorari.
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III. The Failure to Reach a Verdict Issue 
We consider claims for ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-pronged 
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 
2d 674 (1984). To obtain PCR under the Strickland test, the applicant must show 
"(1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different."  Williams v. State, 363 S.C. 341, 343, 611 
S.E.2d 232, 233 (2005) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 
L. E. 2d at 693). 
Winkler contends his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness because they should have objected to the trial court's decision not 
to answer the jury's questions. Winkler bases his argument initially on South 
Carolina Code subsection 16-3-20(C) (2015), which provides,  
If members of the jury after a reasonable deliberation 
cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not 
the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant 
found guilty of murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such 
jury and shall sentence the defendant to life 
imprisonment as provided in subsection (A).   
Winkler argues that when the jury asked what would happen if it did not reach a 
unanimous sentencing verdict, the trial court was required under subsection 16-3-
20(C), due process,2 and the Eighth Amendment3 to inform the jury the defendant 
would be sentenced to life in prison, which "means until the death of the defendant 
without the possibility of parole."  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) (2015).  When the 
trial court refused to inform the jury of this, Winkler argues, his trial counsel 
should have objected.   
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall . . . deprive any person of life 
. . . without due process of law; . . . ."); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("nor shall any 
person be deprived of life . . . without due process of law"). 
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"); 
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 8-10, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2010, 129 L. Ed. 2d 1, 
10-11 (1994) (summarizing prior case law to recognize the Eighth Amendment 
prevents misleading the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process). 
17 

  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
  
 
The PCR court agreed. The court concluded "the jury is entitled to an instruction 
that the defendant's sentence becomes a matter of law to be imposed by the court if 
they cannot reach a unanimous verdict."  Based on that conclusion, the PCR court 
found trial counsel was unreasonable in not objecting to the trial court's refusal to 
answer the jury's questions, and thus counsel's performance was deficient and 
Winkler satisfied the first prong of Strickland. We disagree. 
At the PCR trial, Winkler's PCR counsel gave trial counsel Ralph Wilson a chance 
to explain why he didn't object.  Wilson testified "my understanding is . . . if a jury 
asks a question about what happens if they're deadlocked then the Judge can't then 
tell them . . . that this defendant is going to get a life sentence."  As we will 
explain, trial counsel's understanding was consistent with applicable precedent.  In 
fact, we can find no South Carolina or federal precedent on which Winkler's trial 
counsel could have relied to support making an objection.  The PCR court's 
conclusion, on the other hand, had no support in South Carolina or federal 
precedent. Thus, we find the PCR court's conclusion was an error of law, and the 
error controlled its finding as to trial counsel's performance. See Jordan v. State, 
406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2013) (stating we "will reverse the 
decision of the PCR court when it is controlled by an error of law"); Edwards v. 
State, 392 S.C. 449, 455, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011) ("The appellate court will 
reverse the PCR court only where there is either no probative evidence to support 
the decision or the decision was controlled by an error of law.").  Because no 
applicable precedent supported making an objection, we find trial counsel's
decision not to object was reasonable. See Harden v. State, 360 S.C. 405, 408, 602 
S.E.2d 48, 49 (2004) (stating trial counsel was not deficient in not objecting when 
there was "no statutory law or judicial precedent in this State" on which to base an 
objection).
In State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981),4 the appellant argued "the 
trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury initially that if they failed to agree to 
the verdict, then the court would be required to sentence him to life imprisonment."  
277 S.C. at 124, 283 S.E.2d at 587.  We found no error, and held—referring to 
subsection 16-3-20(C)5—"[t]hat portion of the statute addressing the legal effect 
4 Overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 
(1991). 
5 The language of the applicable sentence in subsection 16-3-20(C) has been 
amended slightly since we decided Adams. See Act No. 83, 1995 S.C. Acts 560-61 
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given to the existence of an unalterably divided jury is addressed to the trial judge 
only and need not be divulged to the jury."  Id. 
In State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), we again addressed the 
question of whether the trial court "erred in denying [the defendant's] request to 
instruct the jury of the actual effect of failure to reach a unanimous agreement as to 
punishment."  278 S.C. at 584, 300 S.E.2d at 70.  The appellant in Copeland also 
claimed—like here—the trial court erred "in instructing the jury that unanimity is 
required before a life sentence can be imposed."  Id.  Quoting Adams, we affirmed 
the trial court's refusal to charge the substance of subsection 16-3-20(C) and its 
instruction that the "verdict or recommendation" must be unanimous.  Id.  We held, 
"The trial judge correctly stated the applicable law."  Id.
Trial counsel's understanding was also consistent with federal precedent.  In Evans 
v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial 
of a habeas corpus petition that arose out of the petitioner's death sentence in 
Virginia. 881 F.2d at 119. Similar to the situation here, the jury "inquir[ed] of 
whether a life sentence must be unanimous," and the petitioner argued "the trial 
judge improperly failed to instruct the jury that under Virginia law a split decision 
by a capital sentencing jury automatically becomes life."  881 F.2d at 123.  Also 
similar to this case, the petitioner argued "he was denied his due process rights 
because the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that a sentence of life 
imprisonment could be imposed only by a unanimous verdict."  Id.  Alleging a due 
process violation, the petitioner made the same argument upon which Winkler now 
claims his trial counsel should have objected, and the Fourth Circuit found the 
argument "without merit." Id.  The court held, "No obligation exists for the trial 
judge to inform the jury of the ultimate result should they fail to reach a verdict."  
Id. (citing Barfield v. Harris, 540 F. Supp. 451, 472 (E.D.N.C. 1982), aff'd, 719 
F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
In Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 119 S. Ct. 2090, 144 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1999), 
the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the question "whether petitioner 
was entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock" in the penalty phase 
of his federal capital trial. 527 U.S. at 375, 119 S. Ct. at 2096, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 
378. The Supreme Court held "the Eighth Amendment does not require that the 
jurors be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree."  527 U.S. at 
381, 119 S. Ct. at 2098, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 382.  The Court also found applicable 
(enacting the current language for the sentence).  The sentence as it read in 1981 is 
quoted in Adams. 277 S.C. at 124, 283 S.E.2d at 587.  
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federal statutes do not require the instruction, and declined to exercise its 
"supervisory powers" to require the instruction.  527 U.S. at 381, 383, 119 S. Ct. at 
2098, 2099, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 382, 383.
The first prong of the Strickland test requires a court to assess counsel's
performance against an objective standard of reasonableness.  Edwards, 392 S.C. 
at 456, 710 S.E.2d at 64. One of the key circumstances a court must consider in its 
examination of counsel's decision not to make a particular objection is whether 
there was any law to support the objection.  In Harden, the issue before this Court 
was whether plea counsel's performance was deficient when he did not object on 
the grounds of double jeopardy to the petitioner being convicted of drug trafficking 
based on conspiracy and drug distribution.  360 S.C. at 408, 602 S.E.2d at 49.  We 
upheld counsel's performance because we found "no statutory law or judicial 
precedent in this State . . . holds a conviction for both conspiracy and the 
substantive offense relating to the conspiracy . . . constitutes double jeopardy."  Id.
Because the law did not support the double jeopardy objection, we found counsel 
acted reasonably in not making it.  Id.  We stated, "An attorney is not required to 
anticipate potential changes in the law which are not in existence at the time of the 
conviction." Id.; see also Thornes v. State, 310 S.C. 306, 309-10, 426 S.E.2d 764, 
765 (1993) (stating, "This Court has never required an attorney to anticipate or 
discover changes in the law," and citing cases to illustrate the point).   
The situation here is comparable to Harden. At the time of Winkler's trial, South 
Carolina law applicable to whether the trial court should charge the jury the 
consequences of the jury's failure to reach a verdict was limited to subsection 16-3-
20(C) as interpreted in Adams and Copeland. Neither opinion provides any 
support for trial counsel making an objection, nor for the PCR court's finding that 
the jury is "entitled" to the charge.  In fact, we read Adams and Copeland to 
suggest the court should not have answered the jury's question.  We stated in 
Adams that subsection 16-3-20(C) "is addressed to the trial judge only and need 
not be divulged to the jury," 277 S.C. at 124, 283 S.E.2d at 587, and we quoted that 
statement in Copeland, 278 S.C. at 584, 300 S.E.2d at 70-71.   
Federal precedent also provided no support for an objection.  In Evans—a situation 
almost identical to this one—the Fourth Circuit found "no obligation" to inform the 
jury of the consequences of not reaching a verdict, 881 F.2d at 123, and Jones
leaves no argument that federal law would have supported an objection, 527 U.S. 
at 381, 383, 119 S. Ct. at 2098, 2099, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 382, 383.  All of those 
cases—Adams, Copeland, Evans, and Jones—were decided before Winkler's 2008 
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trial. The law, therefore, did not support trial counsel making an objection to the 
trial court's decision not to answer the jury's question.   
Winkler relies heavily on the fact that Adams, Copeland, and Jones dealt only with 
the trial court's initial jury charge, but in this case the jury specifically asked what 
would happen if it could not reach a verdict.  Winkler argues that when a jury 
"makes explicit" a question it has about the law, the trial court must answer the 
question "even where the jury is initially given proper instructions."  We agree this 
case is different because in those cases the jury did not ask the question this jury 
asked. For three reasons, however, that difference does not change our decision.  
First, while this case might be distinguishable from Adams, Copeland, and Jones
on the basis Winkler argues, it cannot be distinguished from Evans—in which the 
jury also "inquir[ed] of whether a life sentence must be unanimous."  881 F.2d at 
123. We do not know the precise question asked by the jury in Evans. However, 
the argument the petitioner made as to how the question should have been 
answered is the same argument Winkler makes here.  Id.  In that almost identical 
factual scenario, the court held, "No obligation exists for the trial judge to inform
the jury of the ultimate result should they fail to reach a verdict."  Id.
Second, the significance of the difference between this case and Adams, Copeland, 
and Jones is limited by the fact that this is a PCR case.  The issue in this PCR is 
not whether a trial court must answer the jury's question when trial counsel 
specifically requests it, but whether trial counsel should have objected to the trial 
court not giving an answer. Specifically, the issue before us is whether Winkler's
trial counsel's decision not to make an objection was reasonable under the first 
prong of Strickland. Adams and Copeland are important to the resolution of this 
issue not because they are controlling—they are not—but because they were the 
only South Carolina precedent available to trial counsel when counsel made the 
decision not to object, and neither case provided any support for an objection.  
Similarly, Jones is not squarely on point with this case, but it does not support 
making an objection to the trial court's refusal to answer this jury's questions.
Third, Winkler's argument that a trial court must accurately explain a point of law 
when a jury asks a specific question about it depends on whether the answer to the 
question is applicable to the jury's deliberations.  Even if a jury asks a specific 
question about a point of law, when the point is not applicable to the jury's
deliberations, the trial court should not answer the question. See generally State v. 
Weaver, 265 S.C. 130, 137, 217 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1975) ("There was no duty of the 
trial judge to instruct the jury as requested by the appellant because such charge 
was not applicable to any issue in the case.").  Therefore, the mere fact the jury 
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asked the specific question did not require the trial court to answer it.  Rather, 
whether the trial court should have answered the question depended on whether the 
point of law about which the jury asked was applicable to the jury's deliberations. 
Winkler argues that Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 
129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994), demonstrates the answer to the jury's questions was 
applicable to the jury's deliberations. In Simmons, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held the petitioner's due process rights were violated when the State 
made his future dangerousness a factual issue and the trial court refused to answer 
the jury's question as to petitioner's parole eligibility.  512 U.S. at 156, 114 S. Ct. at 
2190, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 138; see also State v. Starnes, 340 S.C. 312, 326, 531 
S.E.2d 907, 915 (2000) ("Due process is violated when the State 'raises[s] the 
specter of [the defendant's] future dangerousness generally, but then thwart[s] all 
efforts by [the defendant] to demonstrate that . . . he never would be released on 
parole and thus . . . would not pose a future danger to society.'" (alteration in 
original) (quoting Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165, 114 S. Ct. at 2194, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 
143)). Due process required the jury's question to be answered in Simmons
because the jury needed to know the law related to petitioner's parole eligibility to 
properly deliberate over the factual question of future dangerousness.  See, e.g., 
512 U.S. at 165, 114 S. Ct. at 2194-95, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 144 (explaining that 
without an answer to the jury's question, "[t]he jury was left to speculate about 
petitioner's parole eligibility when evaluating petitioner's future dangerousness").  
In Simmons, therefore, the answer to the jury's question was directly applicable to 
the jury's deliberations. 
Here, on the other hand, we see little possibility that answering the jury's question 
could assist the jury in deliberations.  A juror's knowledge that if the jury does not 
reach a verdict the court will impose a sentence of life in prison will not help the 
juror understand the evidence, or assist the jury in reaching a verdict.  Rather, we 
are concerned that informing the jury what the sentence will be if they do not reach 
a verdict creates a risk that some juror's attention may be diverted away from the 
duty to deliberate, and perhaps even alert a juror that he or she can control the 
sentence by refusing to deliberate. 
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed this concern in Jones. The 
petitioner requested the jury be charged, "In the event . . . the jury is unable to 
agree on a unanimous decision as to the sentence to be imposed, you should so 
advise me and I will impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of 
release."  527 U.S. at 379, 119 S. Ct. at 2097-98, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 381.  Addressing 
the Eighth Amendment argument that the jury could be "misled regarding its role 
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in the sentencing process" by the trial court's refusal to give the instruction, 527 
U.S. at 381-82, 119 S. Ct. at 2099, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 382 (quoting Romano, 512 
U.S. at 9, 114 S. Ct. at 2010, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 11), the Court explained: 
 
The truth of the matter is that the proposed instruction 
has no bearing on the jury's role in the sentencing 
process. Rather, it speaks to what happens in the event 
that the jury is unable to fulfill its role—when 
deliberations break down and the jury is unable to 
produce a unanimous sentence recommendation. . . .  We 
have never suggested . . . that the Eighth Amendment 
requires a jury be instructed as to the consequences of a 
breakdown in the deliberative process.  On the contrary, 
we have long been of the view that "[t]he very object of 
the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of 
views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves."  
We further have recognized that in a capital sentencing 
proceeding, the Government has "a strong interest in 
having the jury express the conscience of the community 
on the ultimate question of life or death."  We are of the 
view that a charge to the jury of the sort proposed by 
petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this 
strong governmental interest.  
 
527 U.S. at 382, 119 S. Ct. at 2099, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 382-83 (footnotes omitted) 
(first quoting Allen, 164 U.S. at 501, 17 S. Ct. at 157, 41 L. Ed. at 531; and then 
quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238, 108 S. Ct. 546, 551, 98 L. Ed. 2d 
568, 578 (1988)); see also State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25, 42 (N.C. 1995) 
(stating "to inform the jury that its failure to agree on determinative issues will 
result in a sentence of life imprisonment would be an open invitation to the jury— 
or a single juror—to avoid its responsibility to fully deliberate and to force a 
recommendation of life by the simple expedient of disagreeing").   
 
Winkler's reliance on Simmons is misplaced because in that case the answer to the 
jury's question was necessary to enable the jury to understand and fully deliberate 
one of the key factual issues in the case.  In this case, the consequence of not 
reaching a verdict was not applicable to the jury's deliberations, and informing the 
jury of that consequence could have created a risk of undermining the 
deliberations. 
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Winkler also argues the decision not to object was unreasonable in light of the trial 
court's instruction on two occasions during the modified Allen charge "the decision 
of the jury must be unanimous."6  The trial court's instruction was correct in this 
respect, however, because a verdict must, under law, be unanimous.7 See S.C.
CONST. art. V, § 22 ("All jurors in any trial court must agree to a verdict in order to 
render the same."); see also Copeland, 278 S.C. at 584, 300 S.E.2d at 70 (holding 
the trial court "correctly stated the applicable law" when it charged the jury in the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial "your verdict or recommendation . . . must be 
unanimous on each count, that is, your verdict or recommendation must be the 
verdict or recommendation of all twelve of you").  Because a verdict must be 
unanimous, the jury may not recommend life unless it reaches a unanimous 
verdict. The fact that subsection 16-3-20(C) requires the trial court to impose a life 
sentence if the jury is not unanimous does not change the correctness of the 
statement "the decision of the jury must be unanimous."  We find trial counsel's
decision not to object to the trial court's refusal to answer the jury's questions is not 
rendered unreasonable by the trial court's instruction "the decision of the jury must 
be unanimous" because the trial court's charge in this respect was a correct 
statement of South Carolina law. 
As we have explained, there was no legal support on which trial counsel could 
have relied to make an objection when the trial court refused to instruct the jury as 
to the consequences of not reaching a verdict in the sentencing phase of Winkler's
trial. Therefore, the PCR court's finding that the jury was "entitled" to the 
instruction was an error of law that controlled its decision to grant PCR.  See
6 On several other occasions during the modified Allen charge, the trial court 
encouraged the jury to reach a unanimous verdict, or otherwise used the word 
unanimous.  Only twice, however, did the trial judge instruct the jury its verdict 
"must" be unanimous. 
7 We do not intend in making this statement to comment on the propriety of 
including such an instruction in an Allen charge. See Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 
483, 493, 552 S.E.2d 712, 717 (2001) (analyzing the circumstance that the "jury 
was told of the importance of a unanimous verdict" as a relevant factor in the 
analysis of whether an Allen charge was coercive).  As we explained in section II 
of this opinion, whether the Allen charge here was coercive is not currently before 
us. We simply observe that the instruction "the decision of the jury must be 
unanimous" is a correct statement of law. 
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Jordan, 406 S.C. at 448, 752 S.E.2d at 540; Edwards, 392 S.C. at 455, 710 S.E.2d 
at 64. We reverse the PCR court's ruling.   
We are not prepared to hold that no situation will ever arise in which it is 
appropriate for the trial court to consider answering such a question.  If that 
situation does arise, however, the trial court should be careful to keep the jury 
focused on its duty to deliberate and not empower one juror to control the sentence 
by refusing to participate in deliberations. See Jones, 527 U.S. at 382, 119 S. Ct. at 
2099, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 382-83.
IV. The Brain Damage Issue 
Winkler contends the PCR court abused its discretion when the court refused to 
grant his PCR counsel additional time in which to obtain and analyze MRI and 
PET scans of his brain.  Without this evidence, Winkler argues, "the PCR court's 
decision denying relief on this claim was not the product of a full and fair hearing."  
We agree the PCR court abused its discretion in not granting Winkler additional 
time. 
A. Relevant Facts 
Winkler filed his initial application for PCR on May 2, 2011 with the assistance of 
the appellate defender who represented him on direct appeal.  On June 24, 2011, as 
required by subsection 17-27-160(B) of the South Carolina Code (2014), the PCR 
court appointed new counsel—Emily Paavola and John R. Mills—who had not 
previously represented Winkler.  Winkler's initial application did not include a 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to properly investigate brain 
damage.  
Subsection 17-27-160(C) of the South Carolina Code (2014) provides, "Not later 
than thirty days after the filing of the state's return, the judge shall convene a status 
conference to schedule a hearing on the merits of the application for post-
conviction relief." In compliance with this requirement, the PCR court held a 
status conference on July 7, 2011.  Subsection 17-27-160(C) also requires the PCR 
trial "must be scheduled within one hundred eighty days from the date of the status 
conference, unless good cause is shown to justify a continuance."  At the July 7 
status conference, the PCR court entered a scheduling order setting several 
deadlines, including (1) December 1, 2011 for filing an initial amended PCR 
application; (2) May 1, 2012 for filing a final amended PCR application; and (3) 
June 1, 2012 for completing discovery.  The July 7 order also provided the PCR 
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trial would be held on or before July 1, 2012.  On September 21, 2011, the court 
amended the scheduling order to set the PCR trial for June 18, 2012.8 
According to Winkler's brief in this appeal, "[a]pproximately two months into their 
investigation, counsel noted potential indicators of brain damage, . . . [and] asked 
the PCR court to grant funding for consultation with a neuropsychologist."9  The 
PCR court granted the funding request on September 9, 2011.  September 9 order 
stated, "Present counsel's preliminary investigation has uncovered potential 
neuropsychological impairments, and the record suggests that trial counsel failed to 
obtain the services of a neuropsychologist."  PCR counsel promptly retained a 
neuropsychologist, who on November 2 recommended to counsel they "consider 
consulting with a neurologist or neuropsychiatrist" for further information about 
Winkler's brain damage. The neuropsychologist also informed counsel "it would 
be very helpful to have neuroimaging."  On November 3, counsel requested 
funding to obtain the neuroimaging—MRI and PET scans of Winkler's brain—and 
to analyze the images.  The PCR court entered an order on November 21 finding, 
"The record reflects that a neuropsychologist has recommended such imaging, and 
that it may uncover neurologic impairment or dysfuntion that trial counsel failed to 
discover." The PCR court found the request "appropriate," the neuroimaging and 
analysis "reasonable and necessary," and ordered funding.
On November 30, Winkler filed a motion to extend the deadlines in the scheduling 
order by ninety days. In the motion, counsel represented to the PCR court that they 
had "begun the process of having these tests ordered by the local expert," but they 
were "advised that it will take approximately 4 to 6 weeks before the initial testing 
can be completed, and approximately 6 weeks after that before additional analysis 
can be conducted by the out-of-state expert."  Thus, PCR counsel could not obtain 
the test results and determine whether they supported amending Winkler's PCR 
application for at least ten weeks, or approximately mid-February—long after the 
December 1 deadline for the initial amendment.  On December 8, the PCR court 
amended the scheduling order to extend the deadline for filing an initial amended 
PCR application to February 2, 2012 and a final amended application by May 1, 
8 The July 7 and September 21 orders are in not the Appendix.  While we have no 
doubt that good cause existed for extending the trial date beyond the 180 day 
provision in subsection 17-27-160(C), it does not appear that either order contained 
a specific finding of good cause. 
9 The appendix does not reflect the precise date of the funding request. 
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2012. The PCR court denied counsel's request to extend the discovery deadline 
and the PCR trial date. 
On January 26, 2012, Winkler was sent to the Medical University of South 
Carolina (MUSC) for the MRI and PET scans.  Winkler obtained the MRI scan, 
but he was unable to have a PET scan because his blood glucose level was 272 
mg/dl—almost three times the normal level.  On February 7, a physician from
MUSC wrote a letter to PCR counsel explaining, "If the patient has an abnormal 
blood glucose concentration, then the imaging will not produce a reliable result" 
and "Mr. Winkler's glucose concentration strongly suggests that he has untreated 
diabetes." 
On February 14, PCR counsel wrote the Department of Corrections to confirm a 
phone conversation from the week before.  In the letter, counsel informed the 
Department of Corrections Winkler's testing indicated he likely had untreated 
diabetes and counsel requested "Mr. Winkler receive testing and treatment for his 
blood sugar . . . as soon as possible."  On April 4, the physician from MUSC wrote 
PCR counsel: "Based on my review of Mr. Winkler's medical summary . . . , it 
appears that Mr. Winkler has finally begun treatment for his diabetes.  However, 
his blood sugar appears to remain far enough outside of the normal range that we 
cannot perform an accurate study."  The physician predicted it would take "six to 
eight weeks of attentive treatment for glucose concentration to return to the normal 
range." On April 5, the physician who was to analyze the scans wrote to counsel 
and indicated "Conducting the analyses normally takes approximately six to eight 
weeks from the time the images are received."
On April 10, 2012, Winkler filed a second motion to extend the deadlines in the 
scheduling order. He asked specifically for "a continuance of 180 days to file his 
final amended PCR application, and adjustments to the other scheduled dates 
accordingly."  In the motion, counsel represented, "Despite efforts to diligently 
investigate this case, for unforeseen circumstances beyond their control, counsel 
are not in a position to formulate, in good faith, all claims for post-conviction relief 
by the May 1st deadline." The PCR court denied the motion "without oral 
arguments or responsive brief." 
B. Preservation 
The State argues this issue is not properly before the Court because Winkler did 
not petition for certiorari from the PCR court's ruling denying the motions to 
extend the deadlines in the scheduling order.  Instead, Winkler raised the issue in 
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his return to the State's petition.  We find the issue is properly before us because 
the issue was presented to the PCR court, ruled on by the PCR court, presented to 
this Court, and the State responded.  See Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 
465, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011) (stating issue preservation rules are "meant to 
enable the lower court to rule properly after it has considered all relevant facts, 
laws, and arguments" (quoting I'On, L.L.C. v. Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 
S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000))); In re Michael H., 360 S.C. 540, 546, 602 S.E.2d 729, 
732 (2004) ("In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised to and ruled 
upon by the trial court. In other words, the trial court must be given an opportunity 
to resolve the issue before it is presented to the appellate court." (citing Wilder 
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998))). 
C. Abuse of Discretion 
We applaud the PCR court in its effort to comply with section 17-27-160's goal of 
expediting PCR trials in death penalty cases. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(E) 
(2014) (referring to "expedited capital post-conviction relief hearings" (emphasis 
added)). However, subsection 17-27-160(C) provides the PCR court should grant 
additional time if "good cause is shown to justify a continuance."  When Winkler's
PCR counsel filed the second motion to extend the deadlines in the scheduling 
order, the PCR court found Winkler had "ample opportunity to investigate matters 
pertaining to the applicant's 'potential brain damage' and 'mental health disorder.'"
We disagree with that finding.
PCR counsel was appointed on June 24, 2011 with no prior familiarity with the 
case. The trial transcript alone is 2955 pages.  Within two months of their 
appointment, counsel discovered "potential indicators of brain damage" and 
evidence that trial counsel did not investigate it.  Counsel promptly sought funding 
for a neuropsychologist, who in turn recommended neuroimaging. Counsel 
promptly sought funding for the neuroimaging.  When counsel discovered it could 
take three months to get the results of the neuroimaging, they promptly filed a 
motion seeking more time.  Winkler's doctors then discovered he had a previously 
undiagnosed medical condition that would prevent accurate results from the 
neuroimaging.  Counsel promptly attempted to get Winkler the medical treatment 
he needed to enable reliable neuroimaging.  From our review of these exchanges 
between PCR counsel and Winkler's doctors, counsel acted efficiently in 
attempting to obtain the neuroimaging the PCR court had previously ruled was 
necessary.  Nevertheless, in early April 2012—two months before the scheduled 
trial date—Winkler's doctors informed PCR counsel it would take three to four 
months to obtain the results of the neuroimaging.  Under these circumstances, we 
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find no evidence to support a finding that PCR counsel had "ample opportunity" to 
develop the case related to brain damage.  Rather, based on the detailed 
documentation of their investigation on the brain damage issue, we find it would 
have been impossible for PCR counsel to obtain PET scans in time to have an 
expert review them and be prepared to testify at the PCR trial.  Therefore, "good 
cause [was] shown to justify a continuance."  § 17-27-160(C). 
We find the PCR court abused its discretion in denying Winkler's second motion 
for additional time.  This ruling left PCR counsel in a position from which they 
could not present evidence to support the claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to investigate Winkler's brain damage.  We find, therefore, the PCR 
court's ruling on the brain damage claim should be vacated.    
V. Conclusion
We granted certiorari on three questions.  As to the first question, we REVERSE 
the PCR court's ruling that Winkler's trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
to the trial court's decision not to answer the jury's questions about the result of not 
reaching a unanimous verdict.  As to the second question, we REVERSE the PCR 
court's denial of Winkler's second motion for additional time in which to obtain 
and analyze MRI and PET scans of his brain.  Based on our ruling, the PCR court's 
subsequent denial of PCR as to trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate and 
present evidence of his brain damage was also in error and is VACATED. 
Because of our ruling on the first question, we need not reach the third question— 
the propriety of the PCR court's attempt to sentence Winkler to life in prison 
instead of remanding to the court of general sessions for a new sentencing 
proceeding. 
We REMAND to the PCR court for further proceedings.       
KITTREDGE, J., concurs. HEARN, J., concurring in a separate 
opinion. PLEICONES, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part in a separate opinion in which BEATTY, J., concurs. 
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JUSTICE HEARN: Although I concur fully with the majority, I write 

separately to address an additional error of law committed by the PCR court that I
believe requires reversal. Specifically, the PCR court allowed two jurors to testify
as to the jury's deliberative process in contravention of Rule 606(b) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Evidence.10 For this reason, I would reverse and remand for a 
new PCR hearing and thus concur fully but write separately. 
In his PCR application, Winkler alleged members of the jury physically 
intimidated the only African American juror to change his vote from life to death 
during sentencing deliberations. Before the PCR hearing began, the State made a
motion to exclude any testimony by the jurors pursuant to Rule 606(b), but the 
court denied the motion and allowed PCR counsel to call two jurors, Juror 
Wallingford and Juror Roughton, to testify as to this issue. 
Prior to the jurors being called, the State renewed its objection to their 
testimony based on Rule 606 grounds. In both instances, the PCR court allowed 
the testimony, stating that as the factfinder at the PCR hearing, it could discern the 
portions of admissible testimony from the portions of inadmissible testimony. The 
two jurors then testified—without further objection from the State—as to specifics 
that occurred during the jury's deliberations during the sentencing phase, including 
the way they initially voted and the reasons they changed their votes from life to
death.11 
10 See Rule 606(b), SCRE (prohibiting post-verdict juror testimony regarding the 
jury's internal workings); Shumpert v. State, 378 S.C. 62, 66–67, 661 S.E.2d 369, 
371 (2008) (explaining Rule 606, SCRE, allows evidence regarding external
influences on the jury's deliberations to be introduced, but prohibits introducing 
evidence of internal influences affecting the jury's verdict—such as comments 
made during deliberations, or the effects of those comments—unless such evidence 
is necessary to ensure the trial's fundamental fairness). 
11 Winkler argues because the State did not object during the jurors' testimony, this 
issue is unpreserved. See generally State v. Johnson, 324 S.C. 38, 41, 476 S.E.2d 
681, 682 (1996) (holding that a contemporaneous objection to allegedly 
inadmissible testimony is required to properly preserve the error for appellate 
review (citation omitted)). I disagree and would find the issue preserved because 
when the PCR court overruled the State's Rule 606(b) objection and stated it would 
determine the admissibility of the testimony received, it relieved the State of its 
burden to contemporaneously object to the inadmissible portions of the testimony.  
See State v. Bryant, 316 S.C. 216, 220, 447 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1994) (finding to
preserve an issue for appellate review, a party need not move to strike testimony 
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In particular, Juror Wallingford (the African American juror) testified that 
contrary to PCR counsel's assertions, he was not physically coerced or racially
threatened into changing his vote from life to death. Moreover, although Juror 
Roughton's testimony briefly touched on Juror Wallingford's treatment at the hands 
of the other jurors, PCR counsel primarily elicited testimony about Juror 
Roughton's reasons for changing her vote from life to death. Juror Roughton 
testified she suffered extreme regret over changing her mind and voting for death,
and in retrospect, she did not believe Winkler deserved the death penalty. Further, 
Juror Roughton testified she—and possibly several other jurors—were extremely 
confused over the trial court's jury instructions, particularly as they related to 
whether the sentence (death or life) had to be unanimous. Juror Roughton stated 
she believed if the jury did not unanimously choose death, Winkler would be 
acquitted and "be out." 
At the close of Winkler's case-in-chief, the State moved for a directed
verdict  on the claim that  the  lone African American juror was physically
threatened to change his vote from life to death. PCR counsel conceded there was 
no evidence of physical coercion and withdrew the claim.12 
Later, in the initial order granting relief, the PCR court found trial counsel 
was deficient during the sentencing phase for failing to object to the trial court's 
"refusal to answer the jury's questions on what would happen if the jury could not 
reach a unanimous verdict on Winkler's sentence." The PCR court found that 
deficiency prejudiced Winkler, although it did not cite any specific facts in support 
of its finding. Rather, the PCR court stated only, "Had the jury's questions been 
answered by the judge, a reasonable probability exists that the jury would not have 
reached a unanimous verdict and the [trial] court would have imposed a sentence 
of life in prison."13 Upon the State's motion to alter or amend the judgment, the 
which the trial court had already ruled was proper, as such a motion would have 
been futile); State v. Ross, 272 S.C. 56, 60–61, 249 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1978) 
(holding that once the judge rules on an objection, counsel need not repeat the
objection after each question).
12 The State also moved for a directed verdict on Winkler's claim that the trial 
court's Allen charge was unduly coercive. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492
(1896). The State argued, inter alia, PCR counsel was attempting to support its 
claim by using Juror Roughton's testimony about what caused her to change her 
mind and vote for death instead of life in violation of Rule 606(b), SCRE. The 
PCR court denied the State's motion for a directed verdict as to that issue. 
13 Generally, a defendant's direct appeal centers on the trial judge's errors, whereas
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PCR court further explicated its prejudice finding, citing exclusively to Juror 
Roughton's testimony regarding the jury's confusion and her regret.14 
Rule 606(b), SCRE, states: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the 
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that 
or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the 
juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror 
may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether 
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 
Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror
concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from 
testifying be received for these purposes. 
PCR focuses on trial counsel's mistakes. Thus, given the procedural posture of this 
case, I find it significant that the PCR court appeared to find error in the trial
judge's failure to answer the questions, rather than trial counsel's failure to object 
to the judge's actions. Regardless, as outlined by the majority, it is at best unclear 
whether an objection would have prompted the trial court to answer the jury's
questions.
14 In discussing the prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to object, the PCR 
court merely stated: 
[T]he testimony presented at this [PCR] trial clearly indicates that  at  
least one juror who opposed the death sentence and desired a life
sentence incorrectly thought that the applicant would be free from any 
sentence unless the jury reached a unanimous decision on sentencing.  
That juror was led to believe that the applicant would be free to go or, 
at a minimum, would receive a new trial on his guilt or innocence 
unless the jury reached a unanimous decision of death or life in 
prison. The evidence indicates that the jury's unanimous decision to 
impose the death sentence in this case was not based upon a correct
understanding of the law but, rather, on the incorrect thought that the
applicant would go free or get a new trial. 
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(Emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Court has previously held that "juror 
testimony involving internal misconduct may be received [] when necessary to  
ensure fundamental fairness."  Shumpert, 378 S.C. at 67, 661 S.E.2d at 371. 
Fundamental fairness is an extremely high bar that essentially requires a 
defendant to demonstrate the jury's verdict amounted to a denial of his right to due
process. Id. at 68, 661 S.E.2d at 372; State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 406, 597 
S.E.2d 845, 849 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Hunter, 320 S.C. 85, 88, 463 
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1995)). In fact, the Court has thus far only recognized two types 
of allegations serious enough to implicate a trial's fundamental fairness: either (1) 
the jury's verdict was a result of racial or gender intimidation of a particular juror; 
or (2) the jury began its deliberations prior to the close of all of the evidence. See
Shumpert, 378 S.C. at 67–68, 661 S.E.2d at 371–72 (discussing State v. Aldret, 333 
S.C. 307, 314, 509 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1999); Hunter, 320 S.C. at 85, 463 S.E.2d at 
314).
In numerous other cases the Court found, absent coercion, a juror's post-
verdict testimony was inadmissible. See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 554– 
55, 647 S.E.2d 144, 158 (2008); Galbreath, 359 S.C. at 405–07, 597 S.E.2d at 849.
Often, such testimony contains merely a "generic assertion that a juror would vote 
the opposite way if given another opportunity," which the Court has previously
found "too closely resembles a case of buyer's remorse from a guilty verdict to be 
given much credence." Shumpert, 378 S.C. at 68, 661 S.E.2d at 372. Moreover, 
even allegations that a juror misunderstood the law do not implicate fundamental 
fairness or due process. Pittman, 373 S.C. at 554, 647 S.E.2d at 158 (finding 
jurors' misunderstanding of the law and other "internal influences," such as 
incorrect information coming from other jurors, did not implicate fundamental 
fairness, and thus testimony to that effect was inadmissible); Shumpert, 378 S.C. at 
68, 661 S.E.2d at 372 (same); Galbreath, 359 S.C. at 405, 406, 597 S.E.2d at 848, 
849 (collecting out-of-state cases). 
Here, Winkler's allegations of coercion—particularly involving the lone 
African American juror on the jury—raised a fundamental fairness issue and 
warranted the PCR court's admission of the jurors' testimony over the State's Rule
606(b) objection. See Hunter, 320 S.C. at 88, 463 S.E.2d at 316 ("We find 
allegations of racial prejudice [or intimidation] involve principles of fundamental 
fairness. Accordingly, the trial judge was proper in considering [the juror's]  
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testimony."). However, critically, the PCR court should have granted the State's 
motion in part and limited the testimony to the allegations of coercion. In failing to
do so, I believe the PCR court committed an error of law. 
Specifically, after the State's objection to each juror's testimony, the PCR 
court informed the State it would hear all of the testimony and later decide which
portions were admissible and which were inadmissible. Thus, the PCR court erred 
in its interpretation of Rule 606(b), SCRE, by allowing PCR counsel to elicit a 
significant amount of testimony as to the jury's deliberative process.  Moreover, the 
PCR court compounded this error by allowing the inadmissible portion of Juror 
Roughton's testimony to pervade its prejudice analysis in its final order, citing 
exclusively to Juror Roughton's confusion and regret over her decision to vote for 
death in support of its prejudice finding.15  As such, there is no admissible evidence 
in the record to support the PCR court's findings, particularly with respect to 
prejudice, and I would reverse and remand for a new PCR hearing in which the 
jurors' testimony is excluded.16 See Dempsey v. State, 363 S.C. 365, 368, 610 
S.E.2d 812, 814 (2005) (stating the Court will reverse the PCR court if no 
probative evidence exists to support the PCR court's findings).
15 Notably, much of Juror Roughton's testimony is precisely the type of testimony 
Rule 606(b) is designed to prohibit. See Shumpert, 378 S.C. at 68, 661 S.E.2d at 
372 (stating courts should give little credence to testimony amounting to mere 
buyer's remorse). Indeed, she plainly stated she suffered (and continues to suffer) 
debilitating regret over her decision to vote in favor of the death penalty. Further, 
a portion of Juror Roughton's testimony revealed the jury may have been laboring
under a misapprehension that Winkler might "be out" if it did not unanimously 
vote for death. At best, that testimony revealed the jury may have misunderstood 
the law, which the Court has repeatedly found does not implicate fundamental 
fairness. See, e.g., Pittman, 373 S.C. at 554, 647 S.E.2d at 158; Shumpert, 378 
S.C. at 68, 661 S.E.2d at 372. 
16 Because Winkler withdrew his claim that Juror Wallingford was coerced into 
voting for death, there are no remaining allegations implicating the fundamental 
fairness of the trial, and thus no additional allegations that would warrant admitting 
any of the jurors' testimony. 
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For the foregoing reasons, I concur fully with the majority.17 
17 The majority rightly declines to address a second, moot error of law committed
by the PCR court. Specifically, after finding counsel ineffective during the 
sentencing phase, the PCR court vacated Winkler's death sentence and sua sponte
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. As the 
State argues, and Winkler concedes in his brief, should the PCR court vacate a 
death sentence, the appropriate remedy is not to itself impose a life sentence on the
PCR applicant, but rather to remand the case back to the court of general sessions 
for a new sentencing proceeding. Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483, 495, 552 S.E.2d 
712, 718 (2001); see also Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 86, 437 S.E.2d 53, 59 
(1993) (finding the appropriate relief to grant upon vacating a death sentence is 
remanding for a new sentencing hearing, and holding that imposing an automatic 
life sentence without a new sentencing hearing "appears to be beyond the scope of 
an appropriate remedy on PCR" (citations omitted)). 
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CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I agree that we must reverse and remand the 
Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) order because the PCR judge abused his discretion 
in denying respondent-petitioner's (Winkler's) request for a continuance.  I write 
separately because I would uphold the PCR judge's finding that trial counsel were 
ineffective in failing to ask the trial judge to respond to the jury's inquires relating 
to the effect of a non-unanimous verdict.  Thus, I would hold that Winkler is 
entitled to a new sentencing proceeding18 even if on remand he is unable to 
establish reversible error on the mental health issue. 
I begin by noting that the majority approaches this case as if the burden were on 
Winkler, rather than on the State, to persuade the Court of reversible error in the 
PCR judge's ineffective assistance of counsel ruling and that this error pervades its 
analysis. Even where the State is the petitioner, our standard of review requires 
that we affirm the PCR judge's factual findings if they are supported by any 
evidence of probative evidence in the record.  E.g., Roberts v. State, 361 S.C. 1, 
602 S.E.2d 768 (2004). Further, as explained below, I believe the majority errs 
when it converts the PCR judge's factual conclusions into an error of law. 
The PCR judge found that a reasonable attorney would have objected to the trial 
court's refusal to answer questions raised by the jury's notes asking what would 
happen if they could not reach a unanimous verdict.  The majority holds that the 
PCR judge's ruling was affected by an error of law because there was no state or 
federal precedent which would have supported a request by trial counsel that the 
jury be instructed that a deadlocked jury would result in a life sentence.  I believe 
that the PCR judge's order is more nuanced than the majority acknowledges.  In 
finding counsel's performance deficient, the PCR judge held:  
Even if the jury is not entitled to an instruction that the 
defendant will receive a life sentence if they cannot reach a 
unanimous verdict of death, the jury is entitled to an instruction 
that the defendant's sentence becomes a matter of law to be 
imposed by the court if they cannot reach a unanimous verdict. 
During the Allen19 charge by the judge in this case, the jury was 
informed that the verdict must be unanimous.  However, S.C. 
Code Ann. § 16-3-20 does not require the jury to reach a 
18 I agree with the majority that the appropriate relief here is a new sentencing 

proceeding, and that the PCR judge erred in sentencing Winkler to life.  See 

Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 437 S.E.2d 53 (1993). 

19 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 
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unanimous verdict.  It only requires a unanimous jury verdict if 
the death penalty is to be imposed.   
As I read the order, the PCR judge held that this jury should have been instructed 
that the result of their inability to reach a unanimous verdict would be to make the 
sentence a legal issue to be decided by the judge.   
In finding legal error here, the majority relies on State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 
S.E.2d 582 (1987) overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 
406 S.E.2d 315 (1991), and State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982) 
as the state precedents.  Both of these older cases stand (if they continue to stand at 
all) for the proposition that a capital sentencing jury need not be instructed before 
beginning deliberations on the effect of a non-unanimous verdict.  The federal 
precedent relied upon by the majority is a United States Supreme Court decision 
deciding the same pre-deliberation issue under the Eighth Amendment. See Jones 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999). Here, of course, we are not dealing with a 
pre-deliberation instruction request nor with an Eighth Amendment claim, but 
rather with the question whether due process required this jury's mid-deliberation 
questions be answered truthfully.  The majority acknowledges these three cases are 
distinguishable, but states there are three reasons why "that difference does not 
change our decision." In my opinion, none of these three reasons creates an error 
of law in the PCR judge's finding that trial counsel were deficient. 
The first reason given by the majority is that in 1989, the Fourth Circuit 
(interpreting Virginia law), held that "no obligation exists for the trial judge to 
inform the jury of the ultimate result should they fail to reach a verdict."  Evans v. 
Thompson, 881 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1989). The Evans jury asked whether a life 
sentence must be unanimous, and Evans asserted that his due process rights were 
violated when the jury was instructed that their "verdict must be unanimous as to 
either life imprisonment or death" rather than being instructed that "a split decision 
. . . automatically becomes life . . . ."  Id. at 123. Winkler's jury, however, did not 
ask whether a life sentence must be unanimous but instead sent two notes.  The
first, sent after six hours of deliberation, read: 
Could you please explain what happens if we're not able to 
reach a unanimous decision? 
The trial judge interpreted the question, without objection, "to be one of academic 
interest" and answered with a note stating "I cannot answer the question the way 
you have phrased it; if you have any questions let me know."  Two hours later, the 
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trial judge sent a note to the jury asking "do you have any questions or messages 
for the court?" The jury responded asking "What [does] the law state when a jury 
does not reach any unanimous decision at this stage of the trial?"  The judge 
responded with this note: "I cannot answer hypothetical questions.  Do you have 
any specific questions to ask or comments that you would like to make about your 
jury?"20 
In my opinion, it is a stretch to equate the question asked by Evan's jury, whether a 
life sentence must be unanimous, with the questions asked by Winkler's jury, 
which was obviously struggling with the consequences if they are unable to return 
a unanimous verdict.  In any case, it is even more of a stretch to say that Winkler's
trial counsel were reasonable to rely on a Fourth Circuit case - of which there is no 
evidence they were aware - in deciding not to ask the trial judge to answer the 
jury's questions. Moreover, the PCR judge did not hold that trial counsel were 
deficient for failing to ask for an "automatic life" charge as in Evans, but rather 
held that a charge to the effect that the sentence would become a matter for the 
court should have been given. The issue before us is whether there is any evidence 
to support the PCR judge's finding that reasonable counsel would have asked for an 
instruction, not whether we can find a twenty-five year old federal case interpreting 
the law of a different jurisdiction that would arguably support their decision not to 
make such a request. Roberts, supra. 
In my opinion, none of the cases relied upon by the majority are precedents that 
excuse a reasonable advocate operating under prevailing professional norms from
requesting that this jury's repeated questions be answered.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510 (2003) (ineffectiveness standard in death penalty sentencing PCRs).  
Instead, Winkler's trial attorneys allowed his jury to be told their questions were 
merely "hypothetical," non-specific, and not capable of being answered.   
The majority's second reason why this case is different is, to me, the most 
concerning. The majority holds the difference here is that unlike the three cases
which it cites, the present case is not a direct appeal.  Were it in this procedural 
posture, we would answer the question whether, under the facts and circumstances
of this case, the jury's inquiries should have been answered.  Instead, since this is 
20 The jury subsequently sent a note saying they were struggling to reach a 
unanimous decision, and were given their first Allen charge at 12:26 am, more than 
twelve hours after they began deliberations.  The jury left without continuing 
deliberations and returned at 9:15 am the next day, requested they rehear the Allen
charge, and following that exited the courtroom, returning a verdict at 10:14 am. 
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"only" a PCR, the question is not whether the capital defendant's due process rights 
were violated, but instead merely whether his trial counsel acted reasonably.  As 
explained below, I cannot countenance what I see as the Court's continued 
devaluation of the constitutional rights of capital defendants.  In 1991, a majority 
of the Court abolished the doctrine of in favorem vitae which had required the 
Court to search the record in a capital appeal for legal error. State v. Torrence, 
supra. The majority of the Court justified the abolition of this common law 
doctrine in large part because of the protections afforded capital defendants by the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.  That PCR is a poor substitute for in 
favorem review, however, was made explicit in Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 
552 S.E.2d 718 (2001). In Franklin, the capital PCR applicant contended trial 
counsel were ineffective in failing to inform him of his statutory right to argue to 
the jury in the guilt phase of his trial.  The Franklin majority acknowledged that 
the applicant had been denied this statutory right, and that prior to the abolition of 
in favorem, this error would have warranted a new trial.  The Franklin majority 
held, however, that with PCR "replacing" in favorem review, a capital defendant 
now bore the burden of proving not only error, but also constitutional prejudice.  
Today, with its second reason, the majority highlights the unfulfilled promise of 
Torrence. I cannot agree that we should afford less protection to capital 
defendants who are forced to litigate claims of constitutional deprivation in PCR 
than to those whose trial counsel preserve these issues for direct appeal. 
The third reason advanced why the PCR judge's ruling must be reversed is that 
"there is little possibility that answering [this] jury's question[s] could assist the 
jury in deliberations."  I cannot agree that this jury would not have been aided in its 
deliberations had it been told that the law would resolve the sentencing issue if it 
were unable to reach a unanimous decision.  Further, this third reason seems to me 
a "difference" directed not at the question whether counsel were deficient, but 
rather whether Winkler was prejudiced by the non-answers given to his jury.  
Finally, I find unpersuasive the majority's stated concerns that answering this jury's 
questions might have diverted a juror from her duty to deliberate, or caused her to 
realize her ability to control the situation by refusing to do so. The issue before us 
is not whether jury's should be given a pre-deliberation charge on the effect of their
failure to reach a sentencing verdict but whether jurors who repeatedly raise 
questions should be told the truth.  In my opinion, the majority's concerns reflect a 
lack of faith in our jurors, and in the jury system as a whole.
Turning back to the question of deficient performance, in Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held the capital 
defendant's due process rights were violated when his jury's question regarding 
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parole eligibility was not answered, leaving them to reasonably believe he would 
be released on parole if not executed.  Here, the failure to answer this jury's
questions reasonably led them to believe either (1) that they had no option but to 
return a unanimous verdict of life or death, thereby coercing them, or (2) that the 
consequence of a failure to agree on one of these two choices would result in an 
entirely different sentence, that is, a term of years or probation, leaving Winkler in 
a similar situation to Simmons.  What other conclusions could the jury draw from
being told that their inquiries as to what would happen should they not reach a 
unanimous verdict was merely "hypothetical," and not capable of being answered?  
While Simmons may not decide the exact due process issue raised by the facts of 
this case, I find a reasonable death-qualified attorney operating under prevailing 
professional norms would have seen the analogy, and used Simmons to argue for 
the judge to truthfully answer this jury's questions.  Therefore, in my opinion, there 
is evidence to support the PCR judge's factual finding that counsel were deficient 
here. Roberts, supra. 
It troubles me greatly that the majority uses cases that, by its own candid 
admission, are "different" to excuse counsels' failure to ask that the jury's questions 
be answered. This is especially so in a capital case where both the legislature and 
this Court have recognized the need for specially qualified trial counsel for 
indigent defendants such as Winkler.21  The prevailing professional norms of these 
specialized practitioners require they recognize, litigate, and preserve for appeal 
novel issues, be aware of current capital jurisprudence, and challenge precedents 
either directly or through analogy.22 
In my opinion, we must uphold the PCR judge's factual findings that trial counsel 
were deficient in failing to ask for jury instructions that addressed the jury's
questions, that as a result Winkler's due process rights were violated, and his legal 
conclusion that Winkler was prejudiced. Roberts, supra. 
Winkler's jury's recommendation of death was not the result of measured 
deliberation, but rather the product of significant jury preoccupation and confusion 
21 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-26(B)(1); (F) (2016); Rule 421, SCACR; see also
Guideline 8.1, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003); State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 
545 (2014) (dissent discusses need for specially qualified capital trial attorneys to 
help address the "heightened reliability" requirement of capital sentencing). 
22 Cf., "[T]he law is not always clear and never is static."  Commt. 1 to Rule 3.1, 
Rule 407, SCACR. 
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 with what would occur should they not reach a unanimous verdict, compounded by 
the court's refusal to treat its questions as valid.  Accordingly, in my opinion, 
Winkler is entitled to a new sentencing hearing even if he does not otherwise 
establish his entitlement to this relief on remand on his claim of ineffective 
assistance for failing to present evidence of neurological and cognitive impairment. 
 
 
BEATTY, J., concurs. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of James L. Bell, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002328 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim 
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). 
 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
November 18, 2016 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  This workers' compensation action comes before this court after 
our supreme court's decision in Hartzell v. Palmetto Collision, LLC, 415 S.C. 617, 
785 S.E.2d 194 (2016), with instructions on remand to address Palmetto Collision, 
LLC's (Palmetto) remaining assignments of error.  Palmetto argues the Appellate 
Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate 
Panel) erred in (1) failing to provide a conclusion of law to satisfy section 42-1-
160 of the South Carolina Code (2015), and vaguely finding Richard Hartzell 
sustained an injury to his back; and (2) awarding Hartzell medical treatment in 
contravention of subsection 42-15-60(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015).  We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hartzell, a fifty-year-old auto body paint technician, worked at Palmetto in early 
2009. When cleaning Palmetto's shop on or around February 25, 2009, Hartzell 
claimed he injured his back while moving tires, rims, and heavy frame equipment.  
Hartzell testified that he began experiencing lower back pain the afternoon after 
completing the work and felt very sore in his lower back the following day.   
According to Hartzell, he notified Mike Stallings, Palmetto's owner, the day after 
the alleged injury that he was "pretty sore," and he "must have hurt [himself]." 
Hartzell testified that Stallings suggested he visit the emergency room if he was 
having trouble with his back; however, he did not seek medical treatment at that 
time. Soon thereafter, Palmetto no longer had work for Hartzell, and he left his 
employment on March 20, 2009.  Hartzell noted that, although he and Stallings 
talked about his back injury during the last weeks of his employment, he never 
further discussed the injury or sought reimbursement for medical expenses from
Palmetto.  On April 1, 2009, Hartzell visited a chiropractor, Dr. H. Austin Murray, 
and reported a job-related lower back injury that occurred on February 25, 2009, 
on the intake health form.1 
1 In an April 2, 2009 narrative report, Dr. Murray wrote that Hartzell stated his 
back injury was not caused by a work accident.  Dr. Murray, however, later wrote 
that Hartzell's symptoms did begin on February 25, 2009, the date of his alleged 
injury at Palmetto's shop.
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On May 10, 2010, Hartzell filed a Form 50, alleging a partial permanent injury to
his back while moving an auto frame machine on approximately February 25, 
2009. Palmetto denied the claim by raising several defenses.  The single 
commissioner held a hearing on the matter and issued an order, in which she found 
(1) Palmetto was subject to the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act2 (the 
Act) because it regularly employed four or more employees; (2) Hartzell sustained 
an injury by accident to his back on or about February 25, 2009; and (3) Hartzell 
timely reported the injury to Stallings.  
Based upon these findings, the single commissioner found Hartzell was entitled to 
"medical, surgical, and other authorized treatment" and ordered a medical 
evaluation to determine whether he (1) was at maximum medical improvement 
(MMI), and (2) required any additional medical treatment or benefits under the Act 
resulting therefrom.  On March 26, 2012, the Appellate Panel affirmed the single 
commissioner's decision.  
Palmetto subsequently appealed to this court, arguing the Appellate Panel erred in 
(1) determining Palmetto regularly employed four or more employees, (2) finding 
Hartzell accidentally injured his back and failing to make any conclusion of law 
thereon, (3) concluding Hartzell timely reported the injury and failing to make any 
conclusion of law thereon, and (4) awarding Hartzell medical benefits for the 
injury. 
In an opinion issued on October 9, 2013, this court reversed the award of benefits 
to Hartzell. See Hartzell v. Palmetto Collision, LLC, 406 S.C. 233, 249, 750 
S.E.2d 97, 105 (Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).  As a preliminary matter, the court of 
appeals found Palmetto regularly employed enough employees to come under the 
jurisdiction of the Act. Id. at 245, 750 S.E.2d at 103.  Nevertheless, the court held 
the Appellate Panel erred in finding that Hartzell provided timely notice of his 
injury within ninety days to Palmetto because such conclusion was not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 246–48, 750 S.E.2d at 103–05.  
Determining that its reversal on the notice issue was dispositive, the court declined 
to address Palmetto's remaining arguments.  Id. at 248, 750 S.E.2d at 105. 
Our supreme court granted Hartzell's petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed.  
See Hartzell, 415 S.C. at 623, 785 S.E.2d at 197.  According to the supreme court, 
2 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-1-10 through -19-50 (2015 & Supp. 2015). 
45 

   
                                        
Hartzell's testimony in which he stated he told Stallings that he was "pretty sore" 
and that he "must have hurt [himself]" the previous day was substantial evidence 
supporting the Appellate Panel's finding that he timely reported his alleged injury.  
Id. The court then remanded the case to this court with instructions to consider 
Palmetto's remaining assignments of error.  Id. at 624, 785 S.E.2d at 198. 
 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
I. 		 Did the Appellate Panel err in failing to provide a conclusion of law with 
respect to section 42-1-160 and vaguely finding Hartzell sustained an injury? 
 
II. 	 Did the Appellate Panel err in awarding Hartzell medical treatment in 
contravention of subsection 42-15-60(A)? 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act3 (APA) governs the standard of 
judicial review in workers' compensation cases.  Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 
135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Under the APA, this court's review is limited to 
deciding whether the Appellate Panel's decision is unsupported by substantial 
evidence or is controlled by an error of law.  Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 
S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 610–11 (Ct. App. 2004).  "Substantial evidence is 
not a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side, but such 
evidence, when the whole record is considered, as would allow reasonable minds 
to reach the conclusion the [Appellate Panel] reached."  Shealy v. Aiken Cty., 341 
S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000).  
 
Normally, the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de 
novo review.  Transp. Ins. Co. & Flagstar Corp. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 389 
S.C. 422, 427, 699 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2010).  However, "[t]he construction of a 
statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most 
respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons."  
Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs In Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 132, 
133 (1987). 
3 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 through -400 (2005 & Supp. 2015).  
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LAW/ANALYSIS  
I. Hartzell's Injury 
Palmetto first argues the Appellate Panel erred in failing to provide a conclusion of 
law with respect to section 42-1-160 and in vaguely finding Hartzell sustained an 
injury. We disagree. 
To be compensable under the Act, an injury by accident must be one "arising out 
of and in the course of employment."  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (2015).  "In 
general, whether an accident arises out of and is in the course and scope of 
employment is a question of fact for the [Appellate Panel]."  Whigham v. Jackson 
Dawson Commc'ns, 410 S.C. 131, 135, 763 S.E.2d 420, 422 (2014).  However, 
when no material facts are disputed, whether an accident is compensable is a 
question of law. Id.
In this case, the facts surrounding Hartzell's alleged back injury were clearly 
disputed by the parties. Therefore, we reject Palmetto's contention that the 
Appellate Panel erred in failing to include a conclusion of law with respect to 
subsection 42-1-160(A) because whether Hartzell's alleged injury is compensable 
was a question of fact. See id.; see also Rhodes v. Guignard Brick Works, 245 S.C. 
304, 307, 140 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1965) (holding the commission's finding that 
deceased employee's heart attack did not arise from his employment within the 
meaning of workers' compensation law was a finding of fact, not a conclusion of 
law). 
We also disagree with Palmetto's argument that the Appellate Panel's order violates 
the APA because its findings surrounding Hartzell's alleged injury were not 
sufficiently detailed to allow for meaningful review by this court.  The APA 
requires that "[a] final decision . . . include findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be 
accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting 
the findings." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-350 (2005).  Moreover, the Appellate Panel's 
findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed to enable the appellate court to 
determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the law was 
properly applied to those findings.  Frame v. Resort Servs. Inc., 357 S.C. 520, 531, 
593 S.E.2d 491, 497 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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In a section addressing the evidence, the Appellate Panel recounted Hartzell's 
testimony, which it found "more credible on the issue of the fact, and reporting, of 
the injury."  Hartzell testified that, to access his toolbox more easily, he cleaned up 
Palmetto's shop by moving tires, rims, and a heavy frame machine with steel posts 
and chains weighing approximately two to three hundred pounds. After he tilted 
the frame machine back on its wheels and moved it, Hartzell testified he began 
having pain in his lower back, which later became worse.  The Appellate Panel
stated in its findings of fact that, "[b]ased upon the medical records and 
testimony, . . . [Hartzell] sustained an injury by accident to his back on or about 
February 25, 2009, while moving a heavy frame machine while cleaning up 
[Palmetto's] shop." (emphasis added). Thus, we find the order complies with the 
APA because it includes a clear and concise statement of the facts supporting the 
Appellate Panel's finding that Hartzell suffered an injury.  See § 1-23-350. 
Nonetheless, Palmetto also argues the record does not contain substantial evidence 
to support the Appellate Panel's finding that Hartzell suffered an injury.  Palmetto 
specifically notes Hartzell never asked for medical treatment during his 
employment and that Dr. Murray's narrative report stated that his condition "was 
not caused by a work or automobile accident."  However, upon our examination of 
Hartzell's testimony—which the Appellate Panel found to be more credible—along 
with his health intake form reporting a job-related injury and Dr. Murray's 
narrative report stating Hartzell's symptoms began on February 25, 2009, we find 
that substantial evidence exists supporting the Appellate Panel's finding that 
Hartzell injured his back by accident at Palmetto's shop.  See Shealy, 341 S.C. at 
455, 535 S.E.2d at 442. 
Therefore, we affirm the Appellate Panel's finding that Hartzell suffered a 
compensable injury under the Act.
II. Subsection 42-15-60(A) 
Palmetto next contends the Appellate Panel erred in awarding medical benefits 
without expert medical evidence in contravention of subsection 42-15-60(A).  We 
agree. 
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the [General Assembly]."  Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 
581 (2000). "The [General Assembly]'s intent should be ascertained primarily 
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from the plain language of the statute."  Ex parte Cannon, 385 S.C. 643, 655, 685 
S.E.2d 814, 821 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
Cty. of Aiken, 354 S.C. 18, 23, 579 S.E.2d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2003)).  "Words 
must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced 
construction to limit or expand the statute's operation."  Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 
495, 499, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007).  "If, however, the language of the statute 
gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to legislative intent, the construing court looks 
to the statute's language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose."  Ex parte 
Cannon, 385 S.C. at 655, 685 S.E.2d at 821.  "The construing court may 
additionally look to the legislative history when determining the legislative intent."  
Id.
Prior to 2007, section 42-15-60 provided the following regarding an employer's 
responsibility for medical expenses in workers' compensation cases: 
Medical, surgical, hospital and other treatment, including 
medical and surgical supplies . . . may reasonably be 
required, for a period not exceeding ten weeks from the 
date of an injury to effect a cure or give relief and for 
such additional time as in the judgment of the 
Commission will tend to lessen the period of 
disability . . . . In case of a controversy arising between 
employer and employee, the Commission may order such 
further medical, surgical, hospital or other treatment as 
may in the discretion of the Commission be necessary.
Hall v. United Rentals, Inc., 371 S.C. 69, 81–82, 636 S.E.2d 876, 883 (Ct. App. 
2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-60 (Supp. 2005)).  
Thus, an employer's liability for medical expenses was capped at ten weeks after 
an injury, but the Act afforded the Appellate Panel great discretion in its ability to 
award benefits beyond this period when it determined treatment would tend to 
lessen the period of a claimant's disability. See id. at 82, 636 S.E.2d at 883; see 
also Dykes v. Daniel Constr. Co., 262 S.C. 98, 109, 202 S.E.2d 646, 652 (1974) 
("[T]here is no liability on the part of an employer to furnish medical treatment to 
an injured employee beyond ten weeks from the date of injury unless in the 
judgment of the Commission it 'will tend to lessen the period of disability.'" 
(quoting Code of Laws of S.C. § 72-305 (1962))).  
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 In 2007, however, the General Assembly passed significant workers' compensation 
reform and amended section 42-15-60 to its current form.  See Act No. 111, 2007 
S.C. Acts 627–28. The statute now provides, in pertinent part, the following: 
 
The employer shall provide medical, surgical, hospital, 
and other treatment, including medical and surgical 
supplies as reasonably may be required, for a period not 
exceeding ten weeks from the date of an injury, to effect 
a cure or give relief and for an additional time as in the 
judgment of the commission will tend to lessen the 
period of disability as evidenced by expert medical 
evidence stated to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-60(A) (2015) (emphasis added).  Therefore, while 
retaining the employer's ten-week liability period, the General Assembly added a 
requirement for expert medical evidence to support an award of additional 
treatment and limited the Appellate Panel's broad discretion to order such treatment 
in a case or controversy between the employer and the employee.  See id. 
 
In its order, however, the Appellate Panel concluded "the requirement of expert 
medical evidence is not triggered unless the employer has complied with the Act 
by providing medical treatment for the initial ten (10) week period after the date of 
injury." The Appellate Panel also stated, and Hartzell argues on appeal, that to 
construe section 42-15-60 otherwise would impermissibly shift the burden of 
providing initial treatment and the medical evidence to the claimant. 
 
We find compelling reasons to reject the Appellate Panel's statutory interpretation.  
See Dunton, 291 S.C. at 223, 353 S.E.2d at 133 (holding the appellate court will 
not overrule an agency's statutory construction absent compelling reasons).  First, 
the legislative history and a plain reading of the statute reveal that an employer's 
responsibility for providing medical treatment to covered employees under the Act 
is limited to ten weeks following an injury.  To hold an employer liable for medical 
expenses beyond this time period, the Appellate Panel must decide that, based 
upon a heightened standard of medical evidence, additional treatment would tend 
to lessen the claimant's period of disability.  See § 42-15-60(A). 
 
50 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
Second, we find the Appellate Panel's construction leads to an absurd result in 
which the statute would only require claimants who immediately report injuries 
within ten weeks to produce expert medical evidence to receive additional medical 
treatment while allowing claimants who file a Form 50 after more than ten weeks 
to receive treatment without producing such evidence.  See Kiriakides v. United 
Artists Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994) (stating that 
statutes should not be construed so as to lead to an absurd result that could not 
have been intended by the General Assembly).  Indeed, as a practical matter, an 
employer simply cannot comply with the ten-week treatment provision of section 
42-15-160(A) if the employee does not promptly report the injury. Cf. Mintz v. 
Fiske-Carter Constr. Co., 218 S.C. 409, 414, 63 S.E.2d 50, 52 (1951) (stating the 
requirement of prompt notice in workers' compensation cases enables the employer 
to "furnish medical care [to] the employee . . . to minimize the disability and 
conseque[n]t liability upon the employer").
Last, contrary to the Appellate Panel's public policy concerns, the General 
Assembly has placed the burden upon the claimant to prove entitlement to worker's
compensation benefits.  See Clade v. Champion Labs., 330 S.C. 8, 11, 496 S.E.2d 
856, 857 (1998) ("The claimant has the burden of proving facts that will bring the 
injury within the workers' compensation law, and such award must not be based on 
surmise, conjecture[,] or speculation."). 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Hartzell never requested medical treatment 
or expenses from Palmetto.  Because more than ten weeks had elapsed since 
Hartzell's alleged injury and the Appellate Panel did not support its decision with 
expert medical evidence, we find it erred when it awarded medical benefits in 
contravention of subsection 42-15-60(A).  Therefore, we reverse the Appellate 
Panel on this issue. 
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Panel's decision is 
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.4 
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
4 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.  
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